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Vietnam: Winnable War? 
By Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., U.S. Navy 
There are those who say the end of the Vietnam War was inevitable from the 
beginning w hen we backed a mccession of venal, slothful governments, 
including that of Ngo Dinh Diem, seen reviewing his troops at Saigon in 
October 1960 with the Seventh Fleet flagship St. Paul as a backdrop. But the 
people who continue to ask "Was it a winnable war?" generally proceed from; • 
the mistaken premise that we fought the war as well as we knew how. f 
1, t / " . .u. 
6 1 
I have thought much upon the Vietnam War since 
I was in my young 30s. It is time co bring it to a 
conclusion in my own mind with one last comment. 
The effects of the war, of course, will linger on. The 
penalties we Americans pay will continue, but on the 
whole we are recovering rather more quickly than we 
have a right to expect-from the wounds co our na-
tional soul, the material deficiencies to our defense 
establishment, the weakening of our foreign policy, 
and the economic disequilibrium that are all part of 
the war's heritage. On the other hand, the penalties 
co the South Vietnamese people linger on and, to our 
discredit , are heavily discounted and almost ignored 
in the United States. The reassessments will continue 
and, by and large, they will be wrong because they 
will be premised wrongly . 
The widely held view is that the Vietnam War 
could not have been won. This view, more implicit 
than explicit, colors most comments that still appear 
in print. Some who had no compunction over our 
participation premise that it was a bad war because 
we could not win it . In rough terms, this evolved as 
the position of chose in the executive branch of gov-
ernment who directed the war . Ochers continue 
along the theme that we could not win because it 
was a bad war. This was the position that evolved 
among the war's congressional and ocher opponents. 1 
Among the first group-those who thought it was 
bad because we couldn't win it-many principled 
people who understood and applauded the reasons we 
were drawn into Vietnam at the outset came to re-
gret our participation, mainly because the resolution 
of the North Vietnamese seemed coo strong for us to 
overcome without pain and destruction contrary to 
the values of our country . Particularly in hindsight , 
they feel chat the moral and treaty links we had with 
the South Vietnamese were properly sacrificed by our 
withdrawal, because co discontinue the destruction 
was more moral t han to cling to chose prior obliga-
tions. We had been cutting off a head co cure a 
headache, or so it seemed . 
. 1 The most extraordinary thing about the reporting of the war was chat 
the responsible individuals in the news media thought they were report-
ing it objectively. War on television in the living room had a massive 
cumulative effect. To prepare for the next war, some grou nd rules had 
better be established in advance defining the proper degree of journalistic 
freedom. I would not like co see a repetition of the sensationalism again, 
but I think the more likely danger co guard against is the opposite . Since 
the government will never forget what happened, the worse threat is that 
of drastic censorship, which would be yet more ill-advised . 
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The second group believes we backed a loser from 
the beginning. Each in the succession of South Viet-
namese Governments was venal and slothful, they 
say. None represented the will of the people. Observ-
ing for the first time at close range the ugliness of 
government in the midst of fighting, they chal-
lenged whether the people of South Vietnam would 
be better off for our participation; whether we should 
fight for a people who would not fight for them-
selves; and in the end whether the war could be won. 
They questioned whether the United Scates could 
win and preserve the peace without more massive de-
struction, enormously greater killing, and a con-
tinued expenditure of tens of billions of dollars for no 
one seemed to know how long. They accepted-one 
should remember-that while they protested our in-
volvement, they gave the North Vietnamese new 
heart and will to fight on. It was an irony of which 
they rarely spoke. 
Boch views are based on the premise chat we 
fought the war as well as we knew how. The truth is 
more probably that we could have won the war, and 
without greater destruction. It is easier to draw this 
conclusion in hindsight than it was in 1965_-che 
pivotal year-but there were ample numbers of the 
military leadership even then who knew we were 
fighting the war foolishly, and they said so in the 
muted voices chat betokened their subordination to 
civilian leadership . From the outset, they argued for 
a more direct and powerful attack in the North. 
Their counsel was disregarded . 
I should point out here what winning the war 
meant. Our immediate objective was to preserve the 
integrity of the South Vietnamese state. O ur objec-
tive was also often given co include saving the South 
Vietnamese people from Communism, along with 
the metaphor of a domino chain of capitulations co 
Communism that would follow. Ac first we thought 
we could preserve South Vietnam by suppressing the 
Viet Cong guerrillas. Lacer we acknowledged chat 
the North Vietnamese were at the heart of threat . In 
any event, we had from beginning to end a limited 
objective: we did not so much want to win (defeat or 
invade North Vietnam) as we wanted to avoid losing 
(preserve South Vietnam). Almost no one challenges 
the rightness of limiting the objective . Certainly I do 
not. The problem arose when this limited objective 
"How perverse-how utterly perverse-that the nation that 
tried harder than any in recorded history to fight with 
forbearance was and is impugned for fighting an inhumane 
war. " 
colored our actions, and in particular, influenced in a 
decisive way our decision to fight defensively in 
South Vietnam insofar as possible. 
We all know now, as many knew then , chat the 
source of enemy strength and will lay in North Viet-
nam. From the outset of our direct involvement, we 
had the air power and the naval power to destroy the 
North Vietnam capacity to fight. Out of a desire to 
limit death and destruction, we exercised a strategy 
of gradual pressure, as we extended the bombing 
targets farther and farther northward, each time al-
lowing North Vietnam to prepare for the next exten-
sion, each time conditioning and hardening them, 
and stiffening their will to resist . It is a numbing 
process that combat soldiers know well . Throughout 
1965 and 1966, we allowed the North Vietnamese 
to disperse their petroleum, their power system, and 
their transportation network. 
Instead we could have struck them before they had 
established their air defenses, we could have ex-
tended our naval bombardment deep into the north 
at once, and we could have mined Haiphong harbor. 
We know what the effect these actions would have 
had because we know the effect of the final , decisive 
widespread strikes in the North at the end of 1972, 
pivoting on the notorious Christmas raids , so much 
deplored by many then and now. These attacks, even 
in the face of a very formidable defense , brought 
about a negotiated settlement. I do not know that 
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the results would have been the same in 1965, but 
there is no doubt chat the effect on North Viet-
namese resolve was devastating in 1972. 
In the 12 official years of the Vietnam War, we 
sustained 56,000 dead. That is about the same 
number that we lost in the three official years of the 
Korean War, a war in which we also fought the 
Chinese. It is about the same number that die vio-
lently in U.S. automobiles every year. More instruc-
tive, South Vietnamese mi litary and civilian casual-
ties over those 12 years totaled about two million out 
of a population of 20 m illion . I do not know the 
casualties in the North during chose 12 years, but 
they must have been numerous. It is hard to believe _ 
that a strong , sustained, and decisive attack in the 
North in 1965 would have caused more casualties, 
North and South . If the entire city of Hanoi had 
been rendered casualties, the total would have been 
425,000. In face the Christmas raids on Hanoi killed 
1,318 and wounded 1,261, or so it was reported by 
Hanoi radio , whose purpose was not to underplay the 
destruction. 2 Nor is it likely that the most forceful 
attack we could have mounted in 1965, short of the 
employment of nuclear weapons, would have been in 
the end more destructive of industry, transportation , 
and housing in the North and in the South. As one 
inde~ of destrnct iveness, the figures given for the 
number of persons displaced in the South are given 
as between five and ten million, a quarter to a half of 
the population. 
It is much easier now co describe what we should 
have done than it was ten years ago. As I have said, 
we had no inclination co defeat North Vietnam, 
2 Taken from Gloria Emerson's Winner, and Lo,er, (New York: Random 
House , 1976) , an example of the ki nd of outraged autopsy of the Viet-
nam War among the zealots who discovered fo r themselves that war is 
cruel , concluded therefore chat it was a bad war, and embarked on a 
frenetic crusade co describe its horrors . 
"From ·the outset . .. we had the air power and naval power 
to destroy North Vietnam's capacity to fight. Out of a desire to 
limit death and destruction , we exercised a strategy of gradual 
pressure, as we extended the bombing targets farther and 
farther northward, each time a/lowing North Vietnam to 
prepare .. . each time conditioning and hardening them, and 
stiffening their wi// to resist. " 
merely to preserve South Vietnam . We feared foreign 
and domestic public opinion . We feared the Chinese 
reaction. We wanted a limited war, no more destruc-
tive than was absolutely necessary . We were haunted 
by our own nuclear weapons, and anyone who advo-
cated a more direct and aggressive application of 
power was suspected of wanting to drop nuclear 
bombs and obliterate North Vietnam . Yet, if one is 
going to be a Monday morning quarterback, he 
ought at least to entertain the notion chat military 
advice was right after all. 
How perverse-how utterly perverse-that the 
nation chat tried harder than any in recorded history 
to fight with forbearance was and is impugned as few 
nations have been for fighting an inhumane war. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff, as I recall , were cool , if 
not cold, toward our involvement in Vietnam. How-
ever, the decision having been made, military advice 
from the outset was consistently chat we must go on 
the offensive vigorously, and in the North . It was 
rejected then as coo brutal, the kind of thing one 
would, of course , expect of the insensitive military 
mind. That advice is still condemned in retrospect 
by chose who thought we were fighting a bad war. It 
is still used co illustrate the heartlessness of military 
leadership . Among some , the savage act at Mylai is 
viewed in the same context as the hawks who urged 
the wholesale bombing of Hanoi at the risk of killing 
civilians . Indeed some would have · lee Lieutenant 
William Calley go as the victim of leaders who 
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trained him to think that way. But Calley was a 
monster or a psychopath. When one accepts war, he 
accepts that some of the dogs of war will be un-
leashed, and some madmen wi ll be uncovered or 
created. Calley is not the same as the generals who 
questioned our involvement in the first place , but 
who also believed that a war worth fighting at all is a 
war worth winning. They accepted , as their civilian 
leadership would not , that war is cruel and destruc-
tive at best, and barbaric at worst. 3 
They also knew that to wi n quickly is to win mer-
cifully. The desire of soldiers to fight hard should 
not be misconstrued as a desire to figh t hatefully. A 
fighter knows that his opponent's will to fi g ht back 
ought not to be underestimated . I want to dwell on 
this with two examples , because it is far more impor-
tant in the long run to understand why sound mili-
tary leadership insis ts on fighting wi th what to some 
seems ruthlessness than it is to conduct a post mor-
tem on Vietnam. 
The name William Tecumseh Sherman still evokes 
bit ter memories of the march through Georg ia. He 
was hated in the South for heartless des truction . At 
the outset of the Civil War, Sherman went north 
from Louisiana where he was president of a little mil-
itary school near Alexandria. He saw his first loyalty 
to the Union, but he loved the South. When he was 
pu t in command of the Western armies in the spring 
of 1864, he and Grant agreed on their strategy. 
Grant would grip Lee and never let him go; no other 
Union general had had the determination to do that 
because it would be, as Grant well knew, a bloody 
business . But Lee was too good to be ou tmaneu-
vered, his soldiers too loyal to the South to have 
capitulated without being beaten in battle . 
Sherman's job would be to march south-bring 
the war to the people. It would be cruel, and Sher-
man knew it. To appreciate his effort to tread the 
line between des t roying the Southern will ro fight 
and vindictively destroying the South , one must 
study the man in detail. Suffice to say , Sherman 
knew the difference. He said before he set out: the 
Southern cause was lost on 4 July 1863 at Vicksburg 
and Gettysburg . The Confederates did not yet know 
they had lost . His purpose must be to show them 
3 Would that Lieutenant Colonel Bill Leftwich , USMC, could be re-
membered as our symbol instead of Lieutenant Calley. In another time 
he would have been. The colonel was noted by Time magazi ne fo r his 
good works off the battlefield as well as on it. H e was a leader who 
fought to win without rancor; a man who died, I was mid , flying in a 
helicopter on an extra m ission because " it was t he kind of thing Bill 
would do'"; a hero worthy of anyone's venerati on. The avy remembers: 
DD-984 will be the USS Leftwich. But Calley will be the name linked 
forever wi th the Vietnam War . 
their cause was hopeless and end the war as qu ickly 
as possible. He carried out his purpose remorselessly , 
yet when he took the surrender of Joseph E. 
Johnston in the spring of 1865, Sherman granted 
terms so liberal that , Lincoln being dead, he was vil-
ified in Washing ton and even suspected of treason . 
Everyone knows Sherman said , years later , "There is 
many a boy here today who looks on war as all g lory, 
Lieutenant Colonel Bill Leftw ich 
but boys , it is all hell. " I think perhaps he sa id it 
better elsewhere: "War is cruelty and you cannot re-
fine it." 
My second example is the British General Douglas 
H aig who was known as a butcher of the Western 
Front. Until I read more about him , I used hi m as 
an example of the brutal general who wasted men . I 
was wrong, or more wrong than right . Haig rose to 
prominence before 1914 with tactical brillance and 
strategic foresight. He was among the few in Great 
Britain who predicted a total war, saw that Britain 
must raise a large Army , and believed that if the 
Army were not committed ·on the Western Front , 
France must lose . He anticipated a stalemate, and 
when in command argued that Germany could not 
be defeated and the war terminated until the German 
Army was defeated. On each side by 1916 the com-
mitment to win- or rather , not to lose-was too 
g reat , emotions too deep. The Germans believed that 
if they lost , the peace terms would be intolerably 
vindictive and, as events proved, they were right. So 
Haig fought a war of attrition to destroy the German 
Army and terminate the war as quickly as possible. 
Not everyone agrees that his frontal assaults were the 
best way to defeat the German Army . Perhaps a 
George Patton could have been quicker and cleaner. 
But Haig knew it was too late to avoid a decisive, 
bloody struggle wi th the German Army. Prolonging 
General Douglas Haig 
the war with false pity would grind down all the 
participants' power of recovery when the fighting 
was over . 
I have not argued that we were right to have en-
tered the war in Vietnam. I also concede that I have 
not proven that we could have won by striking 
North Vietnam harder. Observe, however, that if we 
entertained the possibility that the war would be ex-
ceedingly difficult to win, then we were all the more 
foolish to have embarked on it with halfway meas-
ures. There is, however, enough evidence to destroy 
the common premise that we could not have won 
without enormous additional cost and bloodshed, a 
premise which has distorted the evaluation of our in-
volvement down to this day. My thesis is that the 
way we fought almost assured that we would lose. 
Unfortunately , that common premise will persist, 
because there is no one to dispute it. Military voices 
are muted because of strictures against officers on ac-
tive duty in responsible positions challenging their 
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civilian leadership publicly, and this must remain so. 
Even today, anyone who speaks against our strategy 
is understood to be voicing the petulance and frustra-
tion of a loser, wanting to have added destruction to 
needless destruction . 
For their part, neither of the parties I described at 
the outset cares to entertain the notion that we 
might have won. Those who directed the war and 
could not win it find the notion an embarrassment. 
Those who opposed the war but could not stop it 
must not even admit the possibility, for the weight 
of the burden they would have to carry is almost 
beyond enduring . For it was their misplaced compas-
sion that engendered our irresolute strategy. It as-
sured that the war would go on and on, and the 
killing and destruction would continue. To know 
that we might have ended the war more quickly ex-
cept for them would be the ultimate irony. So the 
possibility that we might have won and with mod-
est destruction will probably never be debated. 
Nor will my more modest claim, but certain 
truth , be much discussed-that having made the de-
cision to enter the war, by trying to fight with ::om-
. passion we defeated our own purposes, politically, 
militarily , and morally. The cruel part of the Ameri-
can contribution to the Vietnam War was that we 
would not make up our minds . This is said in 
hindsight , but it is the most important lesson of the 
war. 
Much has been written about the start of the war. 
The powerful, and I trust abiding, conclusion must 
be that one should not undertake a war lightly and 
with half a will, for war is a serious undertaking that 
will shatter both bodies and souls. It is a lesson re-
learned. But not enough has been said about the end 
of the war. It is one thing to have lost the war, 
which is what history will record. It is another to 
have chosen to withdraw from it for moral reasons 
(whatever their merit), which is what history will 
forget. But it is something else, and much worse, to 
have given the war away, which was what happened; 
and history will never know . 
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